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Rights as a Divide-and-Rule Mechanism:  
Lessons from the Case of Palestinians in 
Israeli Custody  
Hedi Viterbo 
Critics have highlighted the complicity of human rights law in mass 
disempowerment and domination – a criticism equally applicable to child law. This article 
investigates this issue, as evidenced by three recent developments that Israel has justified by 
invoking these legal frameworks: an increased separation of Palestinian adults and 
children in Israeli custody; the Israeli legal system’s growing preoccupation with 
“rehabilitating” the now-segregated Palestinian children; and the Israeli authorities’ ever-
diminishing interest in such rehabilitation for adult Palestinian prisoners. By canvassing 
the legal architecture, judicial rationalizations, adverse effects, and socio-political context 
of these developments, this article foregrounds their divide-and-rule logic and structure of 
driving a generational wedge between Palestinians and potentially weakening their 
political ties, solidarity, and resistance. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Human rights law has been increasingly complicit in mass disempowerment and 
domination, as several critics (Perugini & Gordon 2015; Douzinas 2007) have shown. 
Of the numerous pitfalls of human rights law, three in particular have contributed to 
this: first, its all-too-frequent insensitivity to social, political, and legal context; second, 
its one-size-fits-all application of rights – the crude grouping of individuals into legal 
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categories without due attention to their diversity; and finally, its overemphasis, at 
times, on formal as opposed to actual rights (Kennedy 2004; Douzinas 2007, 2012; 
Scheingold 2004). For these and related reasons, some have indeed cautioned against 
applying this legal framework to the contexts of military occupation (Gross 2007) and 
armed conflict (Modirzadeh 2010). 
Child law, the gamut of legal frameworks relating to children, likewise has a long 
history of contributing, unwittingly or not, to the disempowerment and domination of 
many, including some of its own purported beneficiaries (Monk 2009; Kline 1992; 
White 1994; Viterbo forthcoming). In various ways, child law has targeted and affected 
adults as much as children. The legal separation and distinction of adults from children 
– through, for instance, the setting up of a juvenile justice system, the establishment of 
compulsory schools, and the legal separation of home from work – has radically 
transformed both childhood and adulthood. Childhood has become mostly a time of 
prolonged dependency, of exclusion and “protection” from the adult world, while 
adulthood has come to denote a state of unsurpassed autonomy, rationality, and 
maturity (Feld 1999; Kennedy 2006; Buckingham 2000; Ainsworth 1995). Modern 
law‟s demarcation of the category “child” has thus both invented adulthood in its 
present form and, to some extent, exempted society from leniency and compassion 
toward adults. Criminal law, for one, has generally come to hold adult transgressors – 
now considered the antithesis of children – to excessively idealized standards of 
responsibility, autonomy, and fixed character (Ainsworth 1995).  
While the child/adult divide may be ubiquitous, certain ethnic and socio-
economic groups seem to have borne its major brunt. Western discourses and practices 
surrounding the Global South provide various examples: humanitarian campaigns that 
disenfranchize Third World adults by treating children as quintessential aid recipients 
(Burman 1994); humanitarian agencies that regard even the most violent child soldiers 
as powerless victims, granting them access to postwar development funds while 
neglecting their victims (Rosen 2007); and counterinsurgency discourses, wherein the 
image of children and women as relatively innocent victims helps perpetuate the 
presumption that Muslim men are culpable terrorists (Carpenter 2006). In addition, 
since at least the seventeenth century and well into the twentieth century, across the 
world, children of certain backgrounds were taken from their families and communities 
in the name of law, in some instances on a large scale, and placed in reformatories, 
industrial schools and orphanages, or put up for adoption. Such removals were typically 
presented as salvaging children from depraved and unhealthy social environments and 
turning them into civilized, disciplined, and productive citizens. The result in many 
cases, in addition to severing family, communal, and cultural ties, was rampant child 
abuse in state custody. Among those subjected to such separation were poor and 
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working-class children in Britain; indigenous and “mixed-race” children in countries 
ranging from Australia, Canada, and the United States to Indonesia and Morocco; 
ethnic minority children in Switzerland; and the list could go on (Viterbo forthcoming). 
Shedding light on these pitfalls of human rights law, child law, and their 
offspring children‟s rights law, this article examines the joint infusion of these legal 
frameworks into the context of Palestinians in Israeli custody, and foregrounds their 
consequent implication in Israel‟s burgeoning divide-and-rule apparatus. This inquiry 
focuses on three recent developments: a growing separation of adult Palestinian inmates 
from their child counterparts; greater preoccupation, on the Israeli legal system‟s part, 
with “rehabilitating” the now-segregated Palestinian children; and the ever-growing 
disinterest of Israeli authorities in “rehabilitating” Palestinian adult prisoners. 
Rather than legalistically asking to what extent these developments constitute a 
“correct” interpretation of international law, this article critically investigates how, to 
what effect, and why Israeli authorities have interpreted and utilized the law as they 
have. As ever, law – including international children‟s rights law – lends itself to 
competing uses and interpretations, by both proponents and critics of these 
developments. Thus, children‟s separation and rehabilitation in penal settings are 
principles enshrined, in different formulations, in the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (Art. 37(c)), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Arts. 
10.2.(b), 10.3, 14(4)), and relevant UN General Assembly resolutions (Beijing Rules, 
Arts. 13.4, 24.1, 26.3; Havana Rules, Arts. 27, 29, 32; Mandela Rules, Arts. 4, 11, 88, 
91-94, 96, 98, 104, 112); at the same time, according to most of these documents, 
actions concerning children, including separation and rehabilitation, should only be 
carried out when they are in children‟s “best interests” and/or when they enhance 
children‟s “well-being” (CRC, Arts. 3, 37(c); Beijing Rules, Arts. 1.1, 5.1, 14.2, 17.1(d); 
Havana Rules, Arts. 2, 29, Annex – Arts. 1, 28). 
When publicly referring to these developments, Israeli authorities and officials 
have indeed invoked international human rights law and child law. This is in keeping 
with Israel‟s tradition of shaping and justifying its policies through legal arguments, 
institutions, and professionals (Craig 2013; Playfair 1992; Hajjar 2005; Viterbo 2014); it 
is also, more broadly, representative of the growing prominence of human rights in 
security discourses worldwide (Kennedy 2004; Douzinas 2007; Perugini & Gordon 
2015). The Israel Prison Service (IPS), Israel‟s national prison authority, has thus made 
a point of publicly maintaining that Palestinian prisoners “are held … pursuant to law 
and international treaties” (IPS n.d.-a), and that their “living conditions, obligations, 
and rights … are legally defined … in accordance with international legal definitions” 
(IPS 2007). Along similar lines, in his statements to the UN Committee Against 
Torture concerning Israel‟s periodic report (UN Committee Against Torture 2009, ¶17-
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18), Israel‟s Deputy State Attorney remarked: “Regarding … [Palestinian] minors‟ rights, 
... under international law ... [and IPS] rules, minors [are] … held in separate facilities 
from adults.” Similarly, according to the Israeli military: “While various complaints 
have been made about [Israel‟s] … administration of law [in the West Bank] … generally, 
and regarding [Palestinian] minors specifically, it is important to emphasize [its] 
conformity with international law and the law applicable [therein]” (Military Courts 
Unit 2015). The military further asserts, in a leaflet distributed to foreign delegations, 
that its courts “were established in accordance with international law”, and that as part 
of its “efforts to protect the rights of all [Palestinian] defendants [in the West Bank] and 
particularly minors, … a juvenile military court was established …, [which] recognizes 
[Palestinian minors‟] welfare and best interests as a factor in the proceedings.” Israeli 
military law, the leaflet continues, now “provides for a separation between minor and 
adult detainees, … [and the] Juvenile Military Court may order … a Probation Officer‟s 
Report [assessing a minor‟s rehabilitation chances]” (Military Courts Unit 2013). The 
military‟s Legal Advisor in the West Bank (Legal Advisor to the IDF 2009) has likewise 
portrayed the military youth courts as “aimed to reflect the legal approach seeking to 
enshrine in legislation the minor‟s rights as defendant, while taking into account the 
principle of the best interests of the minor.”  
Many human rights organizations have shared not only this appeal to law, as 
they have done before, but also the Israeli authorities‟ current interpretation of the law 
as dictating the separation and rehabilitation of Palestinian child inmates. NGOs and 
UN bodies alike tended to campaign against Israel‟s non-separation of Palestinian child 
and adult inmates, and some persist by criticizing occasional instances of non-
separation. Arguments in support of separation, when explicitly provided, have 
commonly rested on either a legalistic will to meet legal standards (UN Committee on 
the Rights of the Child 2013; Addameer 2010, 2011; DCIP & Save the Children – 
Sweden 2009; Cook, Hanieh & Kay 2004; Yesh Din 2007; Military Court Watch 2014) 
or essentialist assumptions, usually vaguely formulated, about the nature and needs of 
children (DCIP 2003; DCIP & Save the Children – Sweden 2009; Cook, Hanieh & 
Kay 2004; for criticism of such assumptions, see Kennedy 2006; Moss 1996; Kelly 
2012). Some NGOs did question the desirability of separation – contrary at times to 
other statements they made – but in most cases this was late into the shift toward 
separation (DCI 2007, 42) or even after the fact (B‟Tselem 2011; but see the earlier 
Cook, Hanieh & Kay 2004). The non-rehabilitation of Palestinian children in Israeli 
custody has also attracted criticism (UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 2013; 
DCIP 2016; No Legal Frontiers 2011; B‟Tselem 2010; DCIP & Save the Children – 
Sweden 2009), though from fewer organizations – perhaps suggesting that others may 
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be aware of its complexities. In these and other respects, human rights organizations 
and Israeli authorities are neither clearly opposing camps nor monolithic. 
Challenging the dominant, pro-separation and pro-“rehabilitation” discourse(s), 
this article sheds critical light on the judicial justifications, inimical effects, and socio-
political context of the recent developments concerning separation and rehabilitation in 
Israeli custody. In the following sections, these developments – which Israeli authorities 
have advocated and justified in the name of law and rights – are shown to evince the 
divide-and-rule logic and structure of severing intergenerational Palestinian influences 
and creating a future Palestinian generation devoid of its predecessors‟ political resolve. 
The seemingly self-explanatory phrase “divide and rule” may warrant some 
clarification, not least because, while having socio-political fragmentation as its typical 
cornerstone (Kilty & Haymes 2000), it has come to incorporate ideas and patterns that 
differ in their mechanisms, details, and implications (Posner, Spier & Vermeule 2010). 
Whereas some (ibid) have applied this phrase to strategies deemed intentional and 
specifically planned, others (Rogers 1990), myself included, avoid equating “divide and 
rule” with “intentions”, whatever the latter term may mean. Typically, scholarly quests 
for intent or motivations either profess to unearth “invisible”, “underlying” motives, or 
treat deeds or statements as indicative of intentions. Yet the former line of inquiry 
tends to resort to questionable structural and/or causal explanations (see Valverde 
2003, 12-14), while the latter rests upon untenable assumptions about the transparency, 
knowability, and even existence of intentions. Aside from these interpretive and 
epistemological perils, conceptualizing state practices in terms of intentions might 
inadvertently facilitate state attempts to legitimize its contentious actions by 
characterizing their consequences as “unintentional”.  
Further, the divide-and-rule dynamic discussed here, significant as it may be, 
does not encapsulate the developments under examination; other forces and patterns, 
falling outside the purview of this article, are certainly at work. Needless to say, in other 
domains divide and rule is far outweighed by more overt violence – two examples are 
Israel‟s killing of thousands of Gazan Palestinians in recent years and the subjection of 
West Bank Palestinians to constant violent assaults by Israeli soldiers and settlers. In 
fact, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(UNOCHA 2016), 2015 saw the highest number of Palestinian casualties in the West 
Bank in the last decade, and 2014 the highest number ever in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip. Furthermore, as in other contexts, the state discourses and practices relating to 
the developments in question are neither univocal nor free from contradictions. The 
aim of this article is therefore to identify and explore an important element without 
reducing all relevant issues to it.  
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The following section provides further background details on the three 
interrelated developments mentioned above, specifically, and on Israel‟s incarceration 
of Palestinians, generally. The next section, Judicial Rationalizations: Battling over 
Palestinian “Souls”, analyzes the Israeli judiciary‟s divide-and-rule justifications, 
according to which separation and “rehabilitation” hold the promise of severing 
intergenerational Palestinian influences and ridding young Palestinians of their elders‟ 
political ideologies. The section Effects examines the changes in governance and 
discourses arising from the developments in question, as well as the potentially 
detrimental impact of these developments on most Palestinian inmates, adults and 
children alike. Placing these developments in their broader context, the section Israel‟s 
Divide-and-Rule Apparatus points to the proliferation and refinement of 
complementary divide-and-rule mechanisms in and outside Israeli prison. The 
Conclusion ties all of these together. 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Since assuming control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, Israel is 
estimated to have taken between 700,000 and 800,000 Palestinians into custody (see, 
respectively, UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the 
Palestinian Territories 2008; Rudoren & Abu Aker 2013), which equates to about a 
fifth of the current Palestinian population in these territories (UNRWA 2010). In the 
absence of clear aggregate figures, it is estimated that Israel has detained between 8,500 
(DCIP et al. 2014) and 12,000 (Addameer 2016) non-citizen Palestinian children since 
2000 (see B‟Tselem n.d.-a for monthly figures obtained from the Israeli authorities).1  
The IPS classifies most non-citizen Palestinian inmates as “security prisoners” – a 
category rarely applied to Israeli Jews (Adalah 2013b, based on information gathered 
from the IPS). While each prisoner‟s classification is left to the prison authorities‟ 
discretion, IPS regulations generally define a “security offense”, vaguely, as an offense 
that is either “by its nature or circumstances a security offense” or is specifically listed in 
the regulations (IPS Commission Ordinance 04.05.00, Arts. 3-4 and Appendices A-B). 
According to IPS figures, in recent years the proportion of “security offenders” among 
Israel‟s prison population has ranged roughly from half to a quarter (IPS 2015), and 
their proportion among child inmates has ranged from half to a third (Knesset Research 
                                                          
1.  These figures do not include East Jerusalem, where nearly 800 non-citizen Palestinian 
children were detained in 2014 alone, according to information provided by the Israeli police (ACRI 
2016a). 
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and Information Center 2015). These inmates are normally held in separate facilities 
and denied many of the rights granted to others in matters including welfare, 
education, and family visits (IPS Commission Ordinance 03.02.00, Arts. 1b & 4a).  
The laws Israel applies to Palestinians suspected of “security offenses” vary 
depending on their place of residence, as do the courts in which they are tried. Each 
year, West Bank Palestinians are tried in their thousands by Israeli military courts (see 
IDF Spokesperson 2007), which assume jurisdiction over Palestinians in the West 
Bank, including territories formally under Palestinian Authority control (Order 1651, 
Arts. 10(d)-10(e)) but excluding East Jerusalem (which Israel controversially purports to 
have annexed). Information obtained from the military suggests that in 2010 the 
conviction rate in these courts was 99.76 percent, and appeals by the military 
prosecution to increase the sentence were twice as likely to succeed than defendants‟ 
appeals (Levinson 2011). Since Israel‟s unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 
2005, Gazans arrested by the Israeli military during its incursions are tried in Israeli civil 
courts, under civil security legislation. All of these non-citizen Palestinians are also often 
detained without trial on the basis of secret evidence that is not disclosed to the 
defense, for consecutive periods of six months each with no set cumulative maximum. 
Palestinian citizens of Israel are tried in civil courts, are not normally held in detention 
without trial (see Adalah 2001 for an exception), and are less frequently classified as 
“security prisoners” (Adalah 2013b). 
Recent developments concerning Palestinian “security prisoners”, as mentioned 
above, include, first, their growing generational segregation – a shift toward increasingly 
separating Palestinian adults from their juniors. Palestinians can be held in the custody 
of either the military or the IPS, the former formally operating according to Israeli 
military statutory law (though occasionally deviating from it – see Viterbo 2012), and 
the latter according to Israeli domestic law. Until not long ago, non-citizen Palestinians 
were incarcerated mostly in facilities run by the military, where, in accordance with the 
military law, all child prisoners were held with adults, as were child detainees aged 
sixteen and over (Order 132, Art. 3). Though there was a legal requirement to separate 
detainees younger than sixteen (ibid), it had limited effect, not only because the vast 
majority of Palestinian child detainees are older (B‟Tselem n.d.-a), but also because it 
was not always enforced (Cook, Hanieh & Kay 2004; DCIP & Save the Children – 
Sweden 2009; Jasser v. Military Advocate General 1996; Barakan v. Military Prosecution 
2010). In the 1980s, Israel avowed it would designate one of its detention facilities in 
the West Bank for Palestinian children awaiting summary trial, but reports suggested 
that the detainees, actually aged up to twenty-three years, were subjected to torture and 
harsh conditions (UN General Assembly 1985).  
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During the early and mid-2000s, responsibility for all facilities holding 
Palestinian detainees and prisoners transferred from the military to the IPS (Yesh Din v. 
IDF Commander in the West Bank 2010; IPS 2007; see B‟Tselem n.d.-b for detailed 
figures obtained from the Israeli authorities), which separates inmates under the age of 
18 from their elders, pursuant to the domestic law (Youth Law, Arts. 13(a), 34b(a); IPS 
Commission Ordinance 03.02.00, Art. 21g; IPS Commission Ordinance 04.08.00, 
Arts. 8a & 8e).2 Israeli military law was later amended to extend separation to military-
run facilities (Order 1644, Art. 46n), where non-citizen Palestinians can still be detained 
(B‟Tselem n.d.-b). The amended military law, like Israeli domestic law, generally 
requires placing children either in a separate facility or in a separate wing inaccessible to 
adult inmates.3 Another amendment to the military law (Order 1644, Art. 1) 
introduced the world‟s first and only (UNICEF 2013a) “military youth courts”, thereby 
instituting separation in Israel‟s military courts as well.4 As a result of these 
complementary changes, Palestinian adults are now, as a rule, separated from their child 
counterparts in Israeli custody (DCIP et al. 2014), though joint incarceration with 
children remains legally permissible in certain circumstances (Youth Law, Arts. 13(b1), 
34b; IPS Commission Ordinance 04.08.00, Arts. 8-9; Order 1651, Art. 149(a1); Order 
1644, Art. 46n); in addition, the IPS still allows several specific Palestinian adult 
prisoners contact (though not joint incarceration) with child inmates, as discussed 
below. 
The second development examined in this article is the Israeli legal system‟s 
growing preoccupation with “rehabilitating” Palestinian child prisoners. In the various 
relevant Israeli statutes, ordinances, and regulations, “rehabilitation” refers to social 
treatment, education, and employment.5 As shown below, Israeli courts have pushed for 
the IPS to rehabilitate Palestinian children by these very means. This, however, has so 
                                                          
2.  In addition, the Israeli police have formally relinquished their responsibility for some 
detention facilities to the IPS (though in practice the division of responsibility is in dispute – see State 
Comptroller 2015). The domestic law (Youth Law, Art. 13(b)) and military law (Order 1644, Art. 46n) 
require generational separation in police stations in the West Bank, where Palestinian children can be 
detained and interrogated before being transferred to IPS custody (see B‟Tselem 2014). 
3.  There is currently one IPS facility designated exclusively for children: the Ofek facility at 
Hasharon Prison, which is designed to hold up to 200 inmates (IPS n.d.-b). While this is where most of 
the educational and rehabilitative services for child inmates are provided (Knesset Research and 
Information Center 2015), reports suggest that the vast majority of Palestinian children are held in 
other facilities, separately from most adult inmates (Addameer 2010; B‟Tselem & HaMoked 2010; 
DCIP 2011, 2016).  
4.  Remand hearings, which constitute about 40 percent of first instance military court hearings 
(IDF Spokesperson 2007), are legally exempt from the separation requirement (Order 1644, Art. 1). 
Nevertheless, UNICEF (2013b) has reported that in practice, the military courts recently started holding 
most of these hearings separately as well when they involve children. 
5.  The procedures for such rehabilitation are not entirely clear (State Comptroller 2014). 
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far been more a shift in judicial discourse than in actual incarceration or trial 
arrangements. Two recent statutory amendments represent very little change. First, 
Israel‟s military youth courts have been legally authorized to order pre-sentence 
evaluations of the likelihood of Palestinian child defendants‟ rehabilitation (Order 
1651, Art. 148), yet in reality such evaluations are infrequently ordered (No Legal 
Frontiers 2011; B‟Tselem 2011; DCIP 2010).6 Second, the IPS is now legally instructed 
to provide all child prisoners, as well as child detainees facing trial, with educational 
and vocational services (Youth Ordinances, Arts. 6-10); but in practice, and largely in 
line with the IPS‟s own regulations (IPS Commission Ordinance 04.08.00, Art. 27h), 
many Palestinian child detainees are either denied or inadequately provided with these 
services, an issue criticized by NGOs (Adalah 2013a; Addameer 2010; B‟Tselem 2011; 
DCIP 2012a, 2016; ACRI 2016a), the Israeli Public Defense (2015), and Israel‟s 
Supreme Court (see analysis below). The limited actual change in this area may be 
partly attributable to the Israeli authorities‟ discord over the feasibility of rehabilitating 
ideologically motivated Palestinians, an issue addressed below. 
A third, related development has been the Israeli authorities‟ ever-diminishing 
interest in rehabilitating Palestinian adults. Israeli authorities had relatively little 
interest in such rehabilitation in the first place: unlike other adult prisoners (Prisons 
Directive, Arts. 11c-11d), adult Palestinian “security prisoners” are not normally 
referred to rehabilitation services (IPS Commission Ordinance 04.54.02, Art. 1b; IPS 
Commission Ordinance 03.02.00, Art. 4b; John Doe v. Parole Board 2016, ¶3, 5; 
Ashkenazi 2013), and the Israeli authorities rarely consider Palestinian rehabilitation 
facilities a viable alternative (B‟Tselem 2011; E-Nasirat v. Military Advocate General 2003; 
Military Advocate General v. El-Farukh 2009). Until recently, Palestinian prisoners could 
take Israeli Open University courses – in which an average of 250 prisoners had been 
enrolled each year, mostly under Palestinian Authority sponsorship (petition in Sallah v. 
Prison Service 2013; Shaked 2009) – but the Israeli government banned these studies in 
2011. In their petition to overturn this decision (petition in Sultany v. Prison Service 
2011), Palestinian prisoners argued at length that these academic studies facilitated 
their rehabilitation, an argument reiterated by Open University lecturers who joined 
the case as amicus curiae (Sallah v. Prison Service 2015). However, the IPS responded that 
“security prisoners” could not be meaningfully rehabilitated, and both a district court 
(Sallah v. Israel Police 2012) and the Supreme Court (Sallah v. Prison Service 2012, 2015) 
denied the petitions. Further, the Supreme Court has reserved its relentless pro-
rehabilitation stance for Palestinian children, while denying adult Palestinian prisoners‟ 
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petitions against IPS decisions to exclude them, as it usually does, from rehabilitation 
programs (Kharuve v. Prison Service 2014). While recently lifting a new blanket ban on 
Palestinian prisoners‟ access to private mental health professionals (who are needed to 
prepare rehabilitation plans for the parole board), the Supreme Court authorized the 
IPS to continue denying access on a case-by-case basis, and emphasized: “the IPS policy 
– which the present case does not challenge – is to exclude security prisoners from 
rehabilitative programs” (Ra’ee v. Prison Service 2016, ¶10, 32 of Justice Vogelman‟s 
opinion). Israeli authorities thus seek to rehabilitate only on their own terms and only 
those they deem corrigible.  
 
 
JUDICIAL RATIONALIZATIONS: BATTLING OVER PALESTINIAN 
“SOULS” 
 
Many Palestinian former prisoners have spoken of Israeli prison as a site for 
acquiring valuable political knowledge and consciousness, terming it “a university”, “a 
school”, “a lecture hall”, and “an academy of political activism”. This imagery, which 
has taken hold in Palestinian society at large, mainly refers to informal study activities 
operated by Palestinian prisoners, usually in self-segregated groups affiliated with 
different political organizations, with teachings that have included Palestinian and 
Zionist histories, Palestinian culture, Islam, security outside the prison, Arabic literacy, 
and Hebrew or English as a second language (Rosenfeld 2004; Collins 2004; Peteet 
2000; Taraki 1990). In a sense, these study activities represent Palestinian prisoners‟ 
struggle to defy Israeli narratives and confines, to transcend the Israeli prison‟s enclosed 
space, if not physically then ideationally (Nashif 2008). The intergenerational 
knowledge transfer involved in these activities (cf Rosenfeld 2004) is among the reasons 
why, in Palestinian discourses, detention and imprisonment have come to signify a rite 
of passage of sorts – a transition of the incarcerated from childhood to adulthood, and 
especially from boyhood to manhood (Peteet 2000; Nashif 2008; Quota, Punamäki & 
El Sarraj 1997).  
In judgments delivered before or during the shift toward generational segregation, 
Israeli military courts presented such intergenerational knowledge transfer as a major 
source of concern. Despite their importance and the fact that they try most of the 
Palestinians in question (Yesh Din 2007; Adalah 2013b), Israeli military courts have 
hitherto received relatively scant academic attention, as have their judgments. Possible 
reasons for this scholarly lacuna include the difficulty of accessing many of these 
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judgments,7 the restrictions imposed on observing military court hearings or 
interviewing military officials (Hajjar 2005; Yesh Din 2007), and the difficulty of 
obtaining clear and precise information from the Israeli security forces about, for 
example, Israel‟s handling of Palestinian children (UN Committee on the Rights of the 
Child 2010; Military Court Watch 2015, 2016; B‟Tselem 2011; State Comptroller 
2015). Yet, military court judgments yield invaluable insights into the workings of 
Israel‟s rule over the West Bank, including those relating to Palestinian detainees and 
prisoners.  
Thus, in 2004, Military Court of Appeals judge Shaul Gordon rejected the 
Military Advocate General‟s appeal to increase a Palestinian‟s sentence (Military 
Advocate General v. Sha’alan 2004), rationalized this decision by describing the convict as 
“a young youth about 18 years old”, and added: “if [he] has not yet adopted the ideology 
popular among many of the prisoners, then in fact a prolonged imprisonment might 
lead him to adopt it.” A few years later (Military Advocate General v. Makhlouf 2009), 
Judge Amir Dahan of the Judea Military Court voiced similar concern over a sixteen-
year-old‟s non-separation from older Palestinian detainees, alluding to the rehabilitation 
issue as well: “The defendant‟s stay in prison hinders … his rehabilitation: it is not 
difficult to predict the consequences of a tender youth‟s long, continuous and daily stay 
with such adults in an institutional doctrinal [meant to say: indoctrinating] framework”. 
Judea Military Court judge Sharon Rivlin-Ahai likewise warned, in another case 
(Military Advocate General v. El-Farukh 2009), that under the military law in effect at the 
time “a 16-year-old [Palestinian] defendant can be incarcerated with adults who 
committed grave security offenses. … Protracted incarceration in such conditions is 
likely to severely harm both his rehabilitation chances and the public interest.” 
An earlier ruling (E-Nasirat v. Military Advocate General 2003), also by Judge 
Gordon, linked separation and rehabilitation in greater depth. Gordon explained as 
follows his decision to shorten a twelve-year-old Palestinian‟s sentence and, unusually, 
accept the suggestion of the defense to transfer him to a Palestinian rehabilitation 
facility: 
 
[T]he appellant is incarcerated with other prisoners, older than him, who 
were convicted of security offenses …. If … there is an alternative 
framework that may distance the appellant from those adults …, then 
                                                          
7.  Since 2008, the military has been sending Israeli online commercial legal database Nevo new 
judgments of the Military Court of Appeals. Yet, first-instance judgments, the vast majority of military 
judgments – in 2006, there were approximately 42,000 first-instance hearings (IDF Spokesperson 2007) 
compared with 267 appeal hearings (Military Advocate General 2011) – often remain unpublished, as 
do most military judgments from previous years. 
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surely this framework must be preferred over prison. … [T]he appellant 
may indeed be distanced, for a while, from those adults who wished to 
capture his soul, and may even receive rehabilitative treatment that will 
help him oppose those adults … in the future. Furthermore, … there is 
inherent risk in imprisonment in the company of security prisoners, as the 
exposure to these prisoners‟ ideologies and the social pressure may also 
have their influence.  
 
While this decision resonates with other judgments in its reasoning, sending a 
defendant to a Palestinian rehabilitation facility is a rare act. Indeed, later Israeli 
judgments, examined shortly, have pressed for Palestinian children‟s “rehabilitation” at 
Israeli, not Palestinian hands. What makes this decision unusual is, first, the general 
absence of rehabilitation facilities acceptable to both the Israeli military and the 
Palestinian Authority, as mentioned above; and second, the military courts‟ high prison 
sentence rate for Palestinian children.  
Indeed, in 2010, I was given supervised access to the Salem Court archive, where 
I analyzed all the court cases from the years 2008-2009 the military had classified as 
involving minor defendants.8 None of these 155 cases ended in an acquittal; the prison 
sentence rate was 93.55 percent (with an average prison sentence of 7.91 months), the 
probation sentence rate was 98.71 percent, and fines were imposed in 96.77 percent of 
cases (indicating that most sentences included all three components: actual 
imprisonment, an additional suspended sentence, and a fine). The few cases ending 
with neither a sentence nor acquittal were closed or deleted for various reasons. Most 
children – 81.7 percent – were remanded until their trials ended, and only 14.5 percent 
were released on bail. Similar findings appear in NGO reports (ACRI 2016b; No Legal 
Frontiers 2011; B‟Tselem 2011; DCIP 2011, 2016). In stark contrast, the custodial 
sentence rate in Israel‟s civil youth justice system has ranged between only 6.5 to 20.6 
percent of cases (see, respectively, DCIP 2011, referring to 2008; ACRI 2014, referring 
to 2010). In addition, the statutory law applicable to Israeli children permits detention 
only as a last resort (Youth Law, Art. 10a). 
The Palestinian child‟s “soul”, as Judge Gordon put it, appears in the above 
judgments as an object of a legal-political battle, a battle over space – over Palestinian 
adults‟ proximity to their juniors – and also against time: one requiring prompt action, 
                                                          
8.  Salem Court is one of two Israeli military courts currently operating in the West Bank, and 
its archive is a portable cabin storing cases from the past two years. The analyzed data concerned the 
defendants‟ age and gender; the charges; the sentences (their length, nature, and rate); the duration of 
time from one stage of the legal process to another; and the length of the charge sheets and court 
decisions.  
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before these children are irreversibly inaugurated into an allegedly nationalistic 
adulthood. Reproducing a prevalent albeit debatable conception of children as highly 
impressionable and tractable, these judgments depict the Palestinian child as 
simultaneously suggestible to the allegedly negative influence of Palestinian adults and 
Israeli intervention. It is in the light of this presumed plasticity of children that the 
judges cited above espouse segregation on preventative grounds and “rehabilitation” on 
corrective ones. 
  Israel‟s Supreme Court has taken this rationale a step further, by repeatedly 
calling for the systematic “rehabilitation” of Palestinian children rather than on a case-
by-case basis. Palestinian children‟s removal from their elders was no longer considered 
sufficient for harnessing their assumed plasticity to its fullest. Instead of merely 
preventing Palestinian ideological influences, a new frontier emerged in the battle over 
these children: systematic Israeli counter-influences. Most of these judgments have been 
unanimous, written by the current Deputy Chief Justice Elyakim Rubinstein, whose 
career, like that of many of his peers, includes service in the military legal system 
(Supreme Court of Israel n.d.-a).  
In a decision to reject the appeals of two Palestinians, aged 14 and 15 at the time 
of their offenses (John Doe v. State of Israel 2007a), Justice Rubinstein commented:  
 
The lack of social treatment and educational arrangements [for young 
“security prisoners”] …. requires rethinking …. [N]obody wishes for minors 
(or others who are very young) … [convicted of] terrorist offenses to be 
upgraded in criminality, and [for] prison to become their university for 
terrorist science … in the absence of … treatment [and] … education. This 
is not only in the minors‟ interest …. It is in the public interest, in order to 
exhaust the possibility ... [that they] can be brought to function in 
accordance with norms and productively.  
 
This extract appears verbatim in three later Supreme Court judgments (John Doe v. State 
of Israel 2007b; Dirbas v. State of Israel 2009; Taritari v. State of Israel 2014), one of which 
(John Doe v. State of Israel 2007b) further warns that imprisoning such “minors with no 
employment whatsoever, is almost by definition a school for many future terrorist 
experts”.  
Along similar lines, in a decision to shorten the sentences of two defendants, 
one of whom was seventeen years old at the time of the offenses (State of Israel v. Gurin 
2009), Rubinstein remarked:  
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[W]e have repeatedly raised … [the issue of] the absence of social or 
educational treatment in prison for minors or very young adults convicted 
of security offenses, whose rehabilitation chances are better [than those of 
older “security offenders”]. … Should prison be … an academy for 
terrorism, in the absence of any counter-barrier of education and 
treatment?9  
 
As explained above, this recurrent image of Israeli prison as a quasi-academic 
setting originates from Palestinian prisoners themselves. Demonstrating the Israeli 
authorities‟ awareness of the prisoners‟ original use of this imagery is an article on 
“security prisoners” in the IPS journal (Shaked 2008, 27; see also ibid, 28-29), which 
characterizes Israeli prison as a “Palestinian academy for national leadership” and adds: 
 
For [such] prisoners …, [Israeli] prison is a stage in … national 
development, personally and collectively. … [T]hese prisoners … have 
delved into Israeli issues, mainly by reading books, … [and] have translated 
… [writings by prominent Zionist leaders and thinkers]. They have had 
ideological debates on the ways and means of acquiring Palestinian 
political independence … [and] the future character of the Palestinian 
state. Over the years, Open University studies were also made available in 
prison. Security prisoners completed Bachelor‟s and Master‟s degrees 
within the prison walls, and a few successfully pursued doctoral studies. ... 
Not for nothing has prison been called “the national Palestinian 
academy”. 
 
It is thus through Palestinian prisoners‟ own conceptual framework that the 
Israeli judiciary has come to problematize their intergenerational interactions. In an 
attempted reconfiguration of prison, this conceptual framework and the 
intergenerational politicization to which it alludes were reconstructed from markers of 
collective Palestinian empowerment into grounds for deploying divide-and-rule 
techniques (cf. Khalili 2013, on the rise, in liberal counterinsurgencies, of incarceration 
policies focused on social engineering). 
                                                          
9.  While stressing that “this applies primarily to minors and very young adults”, Rubinstein 
remarked, in passing, that rehabilitation “should [also] be an option for others interested in reforming.” 
Yet, this one-off comment was not quoted or reiterated elsewhere, and therefore remains 
unrepresentative of the Court‟s otherwise insistent distinction between Palestinian child inmates and 
their elders in this context. 
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Neither the lack of “rehabilitation” services for Palestinian child prisoners nor 
the court‟s resultant anxieties has subsided, as three similar judgments from 2014 
illustrate (two are quoted below and the third is Bakhirat v. State of Israel 2014). In one 
of these (Taritari v. State of Israel 2014), Justice Rubinstein remarked: “This Court has 
repeatedly raised the issue of the treatment of security prisoners who are minors or 
young adults …. Yet unfortunately … we see no actual change.” In another case (John 
Doe v. State of Israel 2014, ¶12), Justice Uri Shoham – who like Rubinstein had 
previously held high-level positions in the military legal system, including service as the 
Military Advocate General and the president of the Military Court of Appeals (Supreme 
Court of Israel n.d.-b) – wrote for a three-judge panel: 
 
We believe, regardless of our rejection of the appeal, that ... defining 
minors as security offenders and the [resultant] lack of a rehabilitative 
program [for them] … is often a self-fulfilling prophecy. … [Including such] 
minors in a therapeutic-rehabilitative process tailored to their needs may 
bear positive outcomes and prevent [their] future return to activity of a 
security-ideological nature… 
 
The Supreme Court, spearheaded by Justice Rubinstein, has generally been 
unanimous in pushing for Palestinian children‟s so-called rehabilitation. Justice Edna 
Arbel initially expressed skepticism: “I agree with [Justice Rubinstein] ... about the 
importance of the rehabilitative process …. At the same time, the question arises of 
whether the purposes of the rehabilitative process can indeed be achieved in ideological 
offenses” (John Doe v. State of Israel 2007b). Yet, eventually, Arbel moved to endorse 
Rubinstein‟s position unreservedly (Kawasme v. State of Israel 2013). 
Reverberating well beyond the Court, these calls to rehabilitate Palestinian 
children have been reported in the Israeli press (Hovel 2014; Levinson 2014), in 
addition to either being cited approvingly by, or receiving support from, the military 
courts (Military Advocate General v. El-Farukh 2009), Members of Parliament (Public 
Petitions Committee 2013), the Public Defense (John Doe v. State of Israel 2007b), and 
the Youth Probation Service in the Ministry of Social Affairs and Social Services (John 
Doe v. State of Israel 2007a). 
The IPS, in contrast, has shown reluctance to adopt the Court‟s rehabilitation 
vision. In a position paper it submitted to the Supreme Court (quoted in John Doe v. 
State of Israel 2007b, ¶b(3) of Justice Rubinstein‟s opinion), the IPS asserted: “security 
prisoners … consider themselves neither offenders nor in need of social treatment. 
[They] … are generally not interested in any contact with social workers whom they 
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consider part of the Israeli establishment.” Questioning this stance, Justice Rubinstein 
contended (ibid, ¶b(5) of his opinion): 
 
With due respect, I doubt that all the minor prisoners share the view 
described by the IPS .... Even if this is the majority view, ... there is no 
room for giving up. Presumably, suitable professional treatment will 
eventually yield results, if not full then at least partial. The benefit ... is not 
only the minors‟ ... but also of the State of Israel. 
 
The Supreme Court is thus one among various institutional players in this dispute. The 
competing views and interests of these different players regarding “rehabilitation”, as 
opposed to their consensus regarding generational separation, may explain the disparity 
between these two areas in terms of actual change on the ground.  
 
 
EFFECTS 
 
 The effects of separation from others are never entirely predictable, nor are those 
of rehabilitation – in itself a highly elastic concept. Changes concerning generational 
segregation and “rehabilitation” in Israeli custody are also bound to affect each 
Palestinian inmate somewhat differently. This, however, should not eclipse systemic 
issues that impact most Palestinian inmates indiscriminately, even if not equally. Such 
issues, and their implications for separating and “rehabilitating” (or not 
“rehabilitating”) these inmates, are the subject of this section. Without dismissing 
possible positive effects, and without claiming the ability to fully generalize or predict 
outcomes, the focus here is on potentially detrimental consequences, in order to bring 
into question and problematize the taken-for-granteds of the dominant, pro-separation 
and pro-“rehabilitation” discourse(s). 
 
 
Generational Segregation 
 
“Penality”, Michel Foucault (1995, 272) observed, is “a way of … neutralizing 
certain individuals and of profiting from others.” This is achieved by drawing 
distinctions and regulating those on both sides – even if only one group is the explicit 
object of regulation (cf ibid, 193). Indeed, as explained earlier, child-related laws, 
policies, and institutions impact and even target adults as much as children. The 
increased generational segregation in Israeli prisons and detention facilities is likewise 
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no less the separation of adults than it is of children. The terminology currently in use 
distinguishes between “youth” and “regular” incarceration facilities/wings and courts. 
However, even if not formally or explicitly designated as such, “regular” facilities and 
courts are adult-specific – and in this sense profoundly new – legal spaces. 
Previously, when Palestinian adults were held with children, there was intense 
pressure on Israel to ensure that its courts, detention facilities, and prisons met 
“children‟s rights” standards. But despite their adult inmates making up around 95-97 
percent of the Palestinian “security prisoners” population (B‟Tselem n.d.-a, n.d.-b), the 
new adult-specific legal sites, devoid of children, are no longer subject to such scrutiny, 
as a fair number of local and international human rights organizations have directed 
their attention away from them. No less importantly, the image of the child, with all its 
emotive-political potency, has been rendered unavailable to campaigns on behalf of 
adult Palestinian inmates. Further eroding the symbolic currency of these adults is the 
intersection of their age and gender – the fact that they are overwhelmingly men (IPS 
2007).  
As discourses surrounding the now-separated Palestinian inmates transform, so 
do Israel‟s modes of governance and penality. For the most part, both Palestinian 
children and adults continue to be denied rights, but now through significantly 
different legal methods. Children, on the one hand, are formally granted rights or 
special treatment, yet often with little if any actual change.10 Military youth court 
hearings do not differ significantly from those concerning adult defendants: sentencing 
guidelines for Palestinian children have not changed since the establishment of these 
courts, and reportedly (B‟Tselem 2011) nor have the actual sentences imposed. Though 
military youth court judges are legally required to undergo “appropriate training”, the 
exact nature of this training is not publicly known (DCIP 2010). Two other provisions, 
which were introduced into Israeli military law in 2011 (Order 1651, Arts. 136a-136c), 
come with clauses and caveats that render them inapplicable in most cases. First, there 
is now a legal requirement to notify parents or relatives of children‟s arrest, but the 
police are authorized to refrain from doing so in the name of safeguarding “national 
security”, “the success of the interrogation”, or “the child‟s wellbeing”. Deviation from 
this requirement is also permitted when children are suspected of “security offenses” 
(ibid; IPS Commission Ordinance 04.08.00, Art. 15) – a broad statutory term 
encompassing all common charges against Palestinian children, such as stone throwing 
                                                          
10.  A notable exception is the recent shortening of the maximum detention periods for 
Palestinians, adults and children (Order 1651, Arts. 31-33, 37). Yet, this change is limited because, 
among other reasons, the statutory amendments sometimes either do not apply to “security offenders” 
or authorize the same maximum detention period as before. 
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or membership of a proscribed association.11 Though similar exceptions formally exist 
in the domestic law applicable to Israeli citizens (Youth Law, Art. 9g), in practice Israeli 
Jews are, as noted above, a tiny fraction of those classified as “security offenders”. 
Second, the police are required to inform children, prior to their interrogation, of their 
right to legal counsel; however the law places the onus of having an attorney‟s details 
not on the police but on the arrested child, who is unlikely to have such information at 
his or her disposal. Hundreds of testimonies of Palestinian child ex-detainees indeed 
suggest that it is rare for children to either receive legal counsel before their 
interrogation or be interrogated in the presence of their parent (UNICEF 2015; DCIP 
2016; DCIP et al. 2014; Military Court Watch 2014). 
On the other hand, when it comes to these children‟s older counterparts who 
are now held in adult-only facilities, Israeli ordinances not only continue to deny but 
also increasingly erode these same rights. In contrast to the formal requirement to 
inform parents or relatives of children‟s arrest, Palestinian adults‟ arrest can be kept 
secret for up to twelve days (Order 1651, Art. 55). And whereas Palestinian children are 
now formally entitled to be informed of their right to legal counsel, no such provision is 
made for their elders, who – unlike other detainees – can be refused legal counsel, 
including in remand hearings, for up to a month (ibid, Arts. 58-59a; IPS Commission 
Ordinance 03.02.00, Art. 17.22.(2); for discussion see Public Committee Against 
Torture in Israel & Palestinian Prisoner Society 2010). The lack of contact with families 
– an issue partly resulting from the complexity and length of obtaining visit permits to 
Israeli incarceration facilities (Ben-Ari & Barsella 2011) – is an area in which the 
erosion of these adults‟ rights is particularly pronounced; while this issue pertains to 
Palestinian inmates indiscriminately, adults and children alike, it has been further 
institutionalized of late in relation to Palestinian adults: the primary IPS regulations 
concerning “security prisoners”, which hitherto made no reference to either adult 
detainees or pre-charge detention (IPS Commission Ordinance 03.02.00 – 2011 
version), now categorically deny visits to adults who are held in pre-charge detention on 
suspicion of “security offenses” (IPS Commission Ordinance 03.02.00 – 2014 version, 
Art. 17b; see also IPS Commission Ordinance 04.08.00, Art. 24). Another regulation 
(IPS Commission Ordinance 04.34.00) was recently amended to specify restrictions on 
meetings of “security inmates” with their attorneys. 
The socio-legal category “child” thus operates as a template for governing 
Palestinian adults no less than Palestinian children. This is also reflected, to some 
                                                          
11.  Common charges in the 155 military court cases discussed above were stone throwing (63 
percent of cases, usually as a sole charge), membership or activity in proscribed associations (30 
percent), Molotov cocktail throwing (17 percent), and possession/trade/use of firearms (25 percent). 
For similar findings see DCIP (2011, 2016); No Legal Frontiers (2011). 
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degree, by the preoccupation of the above-cited Israeli judgments with Palestinian 
adults: the allegedly nationalistic adult “security prisoners” as well as the future adults 
whom Palestinian children could turn into. In fact, other ostensibly child-focused Israeli 
legal measures, outside the separation context, have also been significantly, if not 
primarily, targeted at Palestinian adults. As a case in point, a 2003 military ruling held 
that Palestinian children should be punished severely in order to deter their elders from 
recruiting them into nationalistic activities (Military Advocate General v. E-Nasirat 2003; 
see also Viterbo 2012). 
 At the same time, the potential consequences for those on the other side of 
generational separation – the child inmates – are no less detrimental. The common 
justification for such separation is the moral and physical threat adult criminals 
putatively pose to their younger counterparts. This rationale, however, does not 
necessarily apply to most Palestinian prisoners in Israeli custody, who are not criminals 
in the common sense of the word (Veerman & Waldman 1996; B‟Tselem 2011) but 
“political prisoners”,12 as many of them self-identify, or “security prisoners”, as Israeli 
authorities classify them. And, as noted above, the IPS is legally required not only to 
distinguish, but also to separate these inmates from those classified as “criminal 
prisoners”. 
Moreover, the increased generational segregation might have robbed many 
Palestinian child inmates of valuable intergenerational support. While neither adult 
Palestinian “security prisoners” nor their child counterparts are a uniform group, 
reports suggest that, prior to the shift toward generational segregation, these children 
used to receive educational, psychological, and material care from adult inmates, who 
also represented their concerns to the prison authorities (Veerman & Waldman 1996; 
Cook, Hanieh & Kay 2004; B‟Tselem 2011). Indeed, showing their support for 
intergenerational contact, Palestinian prisoners have secured the right to elect a few 
adults serving long sentences to oversee Palestinian child inmates, while still being held 
separately from these children at night. This, reportedly, has improved these children‟s 
welfare in some respects (DCIP 2016), but has also, as explained below, provided Israeli 
authorities with a new stratagem for tricking child suspects into confessing. 
For the many children who are transferred to facilities inside Israel and 
subsequently denied contact with their families (B‟Tselem 2011; DCIP 2011, 2016; 
Military Court Watch 2014, 2016), such support is particularly crucial (Cook, Hanieh 
& Kay 2004; DCIP 2016). Further, child abusers are often other children – in 
Palestinian society (Cook, Hanieh & Kay 2004), in Israeli prisons (Curiel 2014; 
                                                          
12.  This term is in inverted commas to avoid the overly simplistic distinction between 
“criminal” and “political” prisoners, and specifically to avoid portraying crime outside military 
occupation as apolitical. 
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Prosmushkin 2012), and elsewhere (Ambert 1995; Spain 2013). Prior to their 
separation, adult Palestinian prisoners reportedly facilitated better relations among the 
children by peacefully mediating their potentially violent conflicts (Veerman & 
Waldman 1996), and the several adult prisoners who, as discussed above, are currently 
allowed interaction with child inmates still assume this responsibility (DCIP 2016). In 
addition, some children might experience their separation from adult inmates as extra 
punishment, because in poor families – from which the majority of Palestinian child 
detainees and prisoners come (Cook, Hanieh & Kay 2004; DCIP 2012a; ACRI 2016a) 
– children and adults often sleep in the same room (Veerman & Waldman 1996). 
Indeed, when interviewed by NGOs, some former detainee Palestinian children 
portrayed their joint detention with adults in an unequivocally positive light – an issue 
NGOs have otherwise tended to overlook, as noted above (on how some NGOs in 
Israel/Palestine overlook Palestinian narratives and perspectives, see also Allen 2013: 
25-26). Considering that children‟s testimonies are heavily informed by adults‟ 
ideologies and expectations (James 2007; Spyrou 2011), and given most NGOs‟ 
opposition to joint detention, such positive depictions are especially noteworthy.13  
Thus, a book published in association with the Palestine branch of Defence for 
Children International (Cook, Hanieh & Kay 2004, 134) cites this NGO‟s social 
workers as highlighting a “range of factors that helped [Palestinian] children survive 
their time in [Israeli] prison”, adding: 
 
Some [children] specifically mentioned adult detainees who were role 
models, and a critical source of care and support in a very hostile 
environment: „The adult detainees helped me a lot. They developed my 
character and I benefited from their experience of culture and life. They 
made me feel comfortable. Without their support I would have been lost 
in prison‟; „The children lived with adults who took a lot of care of us. 
Support was strong and detainees discussed their problems. I am still in 
touch with friends I made in prison even though they are much older 
than me.‟ 
 
A twelve-year-old Palestinian provided Israeli NGO B‟Tselem (2008) with a 
similarly positive account of his detention with adults:  
 
                                                          
13.  This, of course, ought not overshadow the insights of critical writing on “voice” and 
“authenticity”: children‟s testimonies do not reveal “the truth”, nor do they represent “authentic” voices 
(Spyrou 2011).  
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They [the Israeli soldiers] took [me and a fourteen-year-old friend] … to 
Ofer Prison and put us in [a] ... section ... which had eighty-three 
detainees, of all ages. … The detainees treated us well. They gave us candy, 
chocolate and potato chips. I felt comfortable. … A detainee helped me 
ask for the doctor to treat my leg. … At first, I was afraid and cried 
sometimes, because my family was far away. … The adult detainees took  
care of me because I was the youngest detainee in the Department, and 
they decided to make me assistant to the [detainee acting as] sergeant of 
the Department. 
 
Other children‟s positive accounts, or mentions thereof, can be found elsewhere (DCIP 
et al. 2014, 26; DCIP 2016). 
In fact, Palestinian child inmates in Israeli custody have not been separated from 
adults. They are not separated from the Israeli adults under whose control they remain 
– the prison and security authorities – and against whose potential abuse they might 
now be less protected in the general absence of Palestinian adults (cf DCI 2007; Cook, 
Hanieh & Kay 2004). Commonly reported forms of abuse of Palestinian children 
during their detention and interrogation include physical violence, threats, and 
protracted handcuffing or binding in stress positions (UNICEF 2015; Military Court 
Watch 2014, 2016; DCIP 2016; DCIP et al. 2014; Addameer 2016). Such abuse by the 
formally non-military IPS is inseparable from Israeli soldiers‟ violence (on which see 
Public Committee Against Torture in Israel 2008; Viterbo 2014) because, among other 
reasons, the majority of IPS staff dealing with Palestinian prisoners are either soldiers 
on active duty or former combat soldiers.14  
Coerced confessions of Palestinian children are a particularly prevalent issue, 
according to various NGO reports (No Legal Frontiers 2011; Madaa Creative Center 
2012; DCIP 2012a; B‟Tselem 2011). The main and sometimes only evidence against 
Palestinian children is the confessions Israeli interrogators extract from them, 
confessions that Israeli military judges rarely exclude (Hajjar 2005; DCIP 2016). Some 
Palestinian ex-detainees, when interviewed about their encounter with the Israeli legal 
system, described their interrogation rather than their courtroom trial as their “real” 
trial (ibid; Collins 2004). This depiction becomes clearer when one considers the 
characteristics of Israeli military court proceedings: the rarity of evidentiary trials, which 
include witness testimony, evidence examination, and closing arguments; the relative 
                                                          
14.  The IPS assigns soldiers to facilities holding “security prisoners” (IPS 2012), where they 
form a large part of the personnel. For example, soldiers make up 51 percent of Ofer Prison staff 
(Telem 2012) and 40 percent of Nafha Prison staff (IPS 2013). Combat military service or training is 
also a prerequisite for employment in the IPS (IPS 2012). 
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brevity of the hearings;15 and the prevalence of plea bargains, effectively meaning that 
many trials are concluded outside the court (Yesh Din 2007; Hajjar 2005; B‟Tselem 
2011). 
As noted above, during the crucial stage of interrogation, Palestinian child 
detainees are denied contact with their parents and prospective attorneys. In addition to 
potentially reducing abuse and coerced confessions, contact with these Palestinian 
adults may also abate the Israeli authorities‟ alleged efforts to use or recruit Palestinian 
children as collaborators (Veerman & Waldman 1996; cf. DCIP 2016) – informants or 
incriminators – a practice reportedly combining inducements and threats, primarily 
during and in between interrogations (Addameer 2014, 2016; DCIP 2012b; Madaa 
Creative Center 2012). At the same time, reports suggest, Israeli authorities arrange for 
contact with other Palestinian adults – informants – who are placed either in the same 
cell as the child or in an adjacent cell with a small opening to solicit confessions 
(B‟Tselem & HaMoked 2010; DCIP et al. 2014; DCIP 2016). There have been reports 
of informants posing as the adult prisoners who, as discussed above, are allowed contact 
with children (DCIP 2016); in this manner, Israeli authorities seem to be using the 
limited intergenerational interaction Palestinian inmates have secured from them 
against the children it was aimed to assist. 
The use of children as collaborators has a dual connection with the 
developments at the core of this article. First, recruitment as a collaborator can hinder a 
child‟s reintegration into Palestinian society upon release (Veerman & Waldman 1996), 
and thus operates similarly to the wedge driven by the generational segregation of 
Palestinian inmates. Second, the Israeli judiciary‟s desire to depoliticize Palestinian 
children can be seen as an attempt to turn these children into Israel‟s collaborators in 
the broad sense of the word.  
Finally, as a result of the increased generational segregation of Palestinian 
prisoners, their self-organized study activities – the centrepiece of the prison-as-
university – have been deprived of much of their crucial capacity for intergenerational 
knowledge transfer, discussed above (cf Addameer 2010, 71-72). In addition to losing 
this intergenerational power, remaining study groups have been placed under heavy 
regulation by the IPS (IPS Commission Ordinance 03.02.00, Arts. 21a-21d), which also 
recently revoked a provision allowing “security prisoners” to teach fellow inmates in 
their ward (IPS Commission Ordinance 03.02.00 – 2011 version, Art. 21b). These 
                                                          
15.  According to Israeli NGO Yesh Din (2007), the average length of military court detention 
hearings observed between 2006 and 2007 was: three minutes and four seconds for extension of 
detention for the purpose of interrogation prior to filing an indictment; a minute and 54 seconds for 
authorizing continued remand until completion of trial; and three minutes and twenty seconds for 
detention hearings concerning minors. For similar findings see No Legal Frontiers (2011).  
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aggregate and complementary developments may help elucidate why these informal 
study activities, though still in existence (Addameer 2010; Journal of Palestine Studies 
2014a, 2014b), have reportedly been on the wane (Daka 2011; Rosenfeld 2014). 
 
 
“Rehabilitation” 
 
The insight that rehabilitation is far from necessarily benign or benevolent is of 
relevance beyond the context of Palestinians in Israeli custody (Foucault 1989, 1995; 
Rose 2007), but its significance and ramifications in this context are unique. The very 
proposition that Israeli authorities should be rehabilitating Palestinian child prisoners, 
though hitherto lacking significant effect, raises three key questions. The first is whether 
Palestinians who violate Israeli military law need rehabilitation, for instance if they 
throw stones at Israeli soldiers – indeed, as noted above, the most common charge 
against Palestinian children. For many Palestinians, the answer is a resounding no 
(B‟Tselem 2011). This is among the reasons why some defense lawyers object to the 
military courts‟ power to order pre-sentence rehabilitation evaluations, a procedure 
discussed above. The excerpt from the IPS position paper quoted earlier also cites this 
view as a main consideration against rehabilitating these children. Thus, in a sense, 
Palestinians share Israeli courts‟ conception of prison as a political academy as well as 
the IPS‟s reservation about rehabilitation, though obviously for different reasons. 
A second question is whether Palestinians‟ rehabilitation, even if considered 
desirable, should be carried out by Israeli authorities. For example, the task of writing 
pre-sentence rehabilitation evaluations has been placed in the hands of the Civil 
Administration – the Israeli body dealing with non-military affairs in the West Bank 
such as land registry, movement permits and work permits – whose commitment to 
Palestinian interests is questionable (Gordon 2008; Zertal & Eldar 2007; Brown 2015).  
The third issue is the actual impact and use of rehabilitation. With regard to 
child inmates, the greater emphasis on rehabilitation has not necessarily substituted 
incarceration, nor has it served as a mitigating factor. Most of the above-cited Israeli 
judgments championing rehabilitation neither avoided nor reduced – and in one case 
(State of Israel v. Gurin 2009) actually increased – young Palestinians‟ prison sentences. 
This is not entirely surprising, given the high prison sentence rate and relatively low rate 
of release on bail for Palestinian children, both mentioned above. Justice Shoham‟s 
caveat to his previously quoted espousal of rehabilitation – “regardless of our rejection 
of the appeal” (John Doe v. State of Israel 2014, ¶12) – explicitly divorces rehabilitation 
from punishment. In addition, the legal system‟s growing preoccupation with the 
notion of rehabilitation might actually mean longer incarceration: the result of ordering 
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pre-sentence rehabilitation evaluations, some defense lawyers have warned, would be to 
prolong Palestinian children‟s detention (DCIP 2010). Moreover, according to a recent 
ruling by Justice Noam Sohlberg – a settler living in the West Bank – the continued 
non-referral of most Palestinian “security prisoners” for rehabilitation (despite the 
judiciary‟s calls) should normally prevent the parole board from ordering their release, 
even when dealing with child prisoners (John Doe v. Parole Board 2016).  
While the exclusion of adult Palestinian prisoners from rehabilitation may 
exempt them from many of these issues, it presents them as incorrigible, and 
consequently works to their detriment in two ways, as touched upon earlier. First, it 
makes them less likely to be paroled, as the Supreme Court indeed recently 
acknowledged (Ra’ee v. Prison Service 2016; John Doe v. Parole Board 2016). And second, it 
makes it easier to retract the few benefits they receive, such as the previously discussed 
enrollment in Open University studies. The Israeli government presented the ban on 
these academic studies as a means to pressure the Palestinian Hamas into releasing 
Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit from captivity in Gaza, but despite Shalit‟s release in 2011 in 
exchange for Palestinian prisoners, this ban remains in place. And since these studies 
enable Palestinians to ideationally traverse the prison‟s confines (somewhat like the 
prisoners‟ informal study groups), this ban operates as a sort of mental incarceration 
and thus as extra punishment, even if not formally presented as such. At the time of 
writing, a bill supported by government ministers is being considered, which would 
revoke Palestinian prisoners‟ remaining benefits that are allegedly “not enshrined in any 
international treaty” (Liel 2016) – thus potentially turning a minimum threshold of 
legally recognized rights into a maximum threshold, as Israel has done before (see 
Weizman 2011, 81-86). 
 
 
ISRAEL’S DIVIDE-AND-RULE APPARATUS 
 
 Israeli authorities subject Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip – as well 
as Palestinian citizens (Lis 2014; Abu-Saad 2008) – to a broader array of complementary 
divide-and-rule policies and practices, some longstanding and others recent. Though 
neither uniform nor fully successful, this divide-and-rule apparatus operates to fragment 
Palestinians, spatially, politically, and socially. Recent years have witnessed the 
proliferation and refinement of this apparatus, both in and outside Israeli prison. It is 
from this wider socio-political context that the above developments derive their 
significance and effects.  
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It seems that for Israeli authorities, Palestinian prisoners are most dangerous 
when unified. Along similar lines to those of the Israeli judgments examined earlier, a 
publication by the IPS (2007, 8, 10) expounds: 
 
Security prisoners … endeavor to … turn prison into a place of training, 
instruction, [and] forming an ideology …. [They seek to] ensure … internal 
discipline and prevent prisoners from collaborating with the prison 
management intelligence. In addition, the prisoners try to operate various 
committees for organizing … education … [and] instructing prisoners …. 
 
Possibly to thwart such collective endeavors, there has been an overall rise in 
Palestinians‟ segregation and isolation, of which the shift toward generational 
separation in Israeli custody is but part. Among other things, the IPS has been reported 
to increasingly segregate Palestinian inmates into cells, wards, and facilities on the basis 
of their regions of residence (Addameer 2011; Daka 2011). While not equally 
implemented across all IPS facilities, this geographically based segregation resonates 
with the general fragmentation of the Palestinian territories, which is ascribable to what 
Israeli officials have publicly termed Israel‟s “separation policy” (Gisha 2014; see also 
Shavit 2004). The Gaza Strip, under constant if changeable closure, has been cut off 
from the West Bank, while the latter, enclosed by the Separation Wall and subject to 
restrictions of Palestinian movement, has been splintered into enclaves that each 
experience Israel‟s control somewhat differently (Handel 2009; Gordon 2008; 
Bornstein 2008; Korn 2008; Gisha 2015). To an extent, Israel‟s actual prisons mirror 
the transformation of the Palestinian territories into a colossal prison of sorts, or rather 
a disjointed network of prisons (Korn 2008; Bornstein 2008; Khalili 2013). In the same 
vein, the Israeli government has both censured and refused negotiation with the 
Palestinian unity government (Sharon 2014), which in 2014 brought together the 
theretofore separate West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinian governments. 
In addition to generationally and geographically based segregation, other recent 
changes have further divided Palestinians in Israeli custody into non-coordinated units. 
Until a short while ago, the IPS regulations made provision for “security prisoners” to 
elect both a ward representative and a central prison representative, the latter receiving 
access to all relevant wards; however, the election of a central representative is now 
banned (IPS Commission Ordinance 03.02.00 – 2011 & 2014 versions, Arts. 6a, 6g; 
see also Rosenfeld 2004; Daka 2011). The heavy regulation and restriction of the 
prisoners‟ informal study groups, discussed above, can be understood as aimed to 
further stymie their political coordination. 
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Incarceration itself has been a means for Israel to remove political activists from 
Palestinian society (Ron 2000; Nashif 2008), including those who are physically non-
violent (Peteet 2009; Jaraisy & Feldman 2013). While in custody, these Palestinians are 
often denied family visits, as explained above, and the IPS highly restricts their access to 
media sources and books (IPS Commission Ordinance 03.02.00, Arts. 21a, 21c, 21e; 
Temporary IPS Order – Acquisition of Newspapers; Matar 2016; see also Addameer 
2010; Daka 2011), and also, as of late, to Members of Parliament (Khoury 2016). 
Palestinian prisoners whom Israeli authorities deem especially troublesome, such as 
hunger strikers, are even more radically cut off from fellow inmates and the outside 
world (IPS Commission Ordinance 04.16.00, Art. 6a & Appendix A). Palestinian 
adults are thus not the only “problem” group increasingly segregated in Israeli prison. 
After their release, Israel keeps Palestinian former detainees under heightened 
surveillance and restrictions, thereby, in a sense, extending their incarceration beyond 
prison (Smith 2013).  
In the spirit of “divide and rule”, such Israeli policies and practices, more than 
merely segregative, are potentially divisive. Israel‟s use and recruitment of Palestinians as 
informants and incriminators, for example, undermines the trust among Palestinians 
that is necessary for solidarity, alliances, and collective resistance (Kelly 2010; Gordon 
2008; Sa‟di 2005). In addition to Palestinian children, whose recruitment was 
mentioned above, Israeli authorities have also – according to Israeli NGOs (Physicians 
for Human Rights – Israel 2008, 2015) and veterans (Rudoren 2014) – focused 
recruitment efforts on other vulnerable sections of Palestinian society, including 
patients, their families, and others in need of exit permits; people requiring other vital 
services and permits; suspects and defendants; and closeted homosexuals. Likewise 
divisive, reportedly, has been the collective punishment of Palestinian “security” 
prisoners for individual violations (Daka 2011). 
Alongside this divisiveness, Israel‟s divide-and-rule apparatus also manifests a 
desire to reshape Palestinian consciousness. Recent formulations of this desire vary: 
from “rehabilitation” of Palestinian children in Israeli custody, as discussed above, 
through “searing Palestinian consciousness” in recent attacks on the Gaza Strip (Shavit 
2006, cited in Daka 2011, 236), to “displaying presence” and “sowing fear” in military 
brutality toward West Bank Palestinians (Zagor 2010). One main arena for such 
attempts to govern and remold collective consciousness has been Palestinian 
educational institutions – key contributors to national identity building and centers of 
political resistance (Bruhn 2006; Zelkovitz 2014). As shown earlier, both Palestinians 
and the Israeli legal system have come to conceptualize Israeli prison as a political 
university. The Israeli judiciary‟s calls to dismantle this so-called university, discussed 
earlier, can be interpreted as aiming to retrieve, in prison, the sort of control Israel once 
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had over Palestinian education outside prison: in the past, Palestinian universities‟ and 
schools‟ curricular and extracurricular activities, as well as their textbooks, were under 
close Israeli monitoring and censorship, anchored in specially designed military 
legislation (Gordon 2008; Bruhn 2006; Zelkovitz 2014).  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Recent years have witnessed three significant developments concerning 
Palestinians in Israeli custody: the increased separation of Palestinian adults from their 
juniors; the Israeli legal system‟s growing preoccupation with “rehabilitating” the now-
segregated Palestinian children; and Israeli authorities‟ ever-diminishing interest in 
rehabilitating Palestinian adults.  
The Israeli judiciary‟s championing of these processes, this article has shown, 
largely revolves around creating a future Palestinian generation devoid of its 
predecessors‟ political tendencies. On the basis of assumptions about children‟s high 
corrigibility and adults‟ lack thereof, and in drawing on the Palestinian imagery of 
Israeli prison as a quasi-academic site, Israeli judgments have called to prevent 
Palestinian inmates‟ intergenerational influences through separation, and to counter, if 
not undo, these influences by “rehabilitating” Palestinian children at Israeli hands. 
These developments have given rise to new forms of governance and penality, 
and have transformed surrounding discourses, with potentially adverse effects for most 
of those on both sides of the generational division: Palestinian adults and children 
alike. As this article has explained, inimical effects include: growing disregard for adult 
Palestinian inmates‟ rights and conditions; granting formal rights to Palestinian 
children with very limited effect, while continuing to deny or even increasingly eroding 
these rights in relation to their adult counterparts; the loss of various forms of 
intergenerational support and protection among many of the inmates; the increased 
vulnerability of many child inmates to abuse and threats by both the Israeli authorities 
and other children; a rehabilitative discourse that overlooks Palestinian reservations 
while neither decreasing incarceration nor sentences; and delegating new powers to 
Israeli authorities whose commitment to Palestinian interests is questionable.  
 In large measure, the developments concerning Palestinians in Israeli custody 
symptomize the broader pitfalls of both human rights law and child law. The former, as 
some critics have shown, often suffers from context-insensitivity, the crude imposition 
of rights with insufficient regard for human diversity, and neglect of actual (as opposed 
to formal) rights. The latter, as this article has explained, has been implicated, from its 
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inception, in legitimizing harshness toward adults, and their disenfranchizement, while 
also breaking up ethnic, racial, and socio-economic “problem groups”. That these 
pitfalls manifest themselves as they have in Israel/Palestine warrants further 
problematization, more broadly, of the often uncritical invocation of these legal 
frameworks. At the same time, in the present context, these legal frameworks have both 
reinforced and been informed by Israel‟s ever-evolving divide-and-rule apparatus, which 
operates to fragment Palestinian society geographically, socially, and politically in and 
beyond prison. This article thus sheds new light on these transnational legal 
frameworks, this specific socio-political context, and their interrelationship. 
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